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The Effect of Public Insurance Coverage for Childless 
Adults on Labor Supply†
By Laura Dague, Thomas DeLeire, and Lindsey Leininger*
This study provides plausibly causal estimates of the effect of 
public insurance coverage on the employment of non-elderly, 
 nondisabled adults without dependent children (“childless adults”). 
We take advantage of the sudden imposition of an enrollment cap in 
Wisconsin, comparing the labor supply of enrollees to eligible appli-
cants placed on a waitlist using a regression discontinuity design 
and difference-in-differences methods. We find enrollment into public 
insurance leads to sizable and statistically meaningful reductions in 
employment, with an estimated effect size of just over 5 percentage 
points, a 12 percent decline. Confidence intervals rule out positive 
and large negative effects. (JEL G22, H75, I13, I18, I38, J22)
Medicaid is currently the second most common source of insurance coverage among individuals in the United States (following private coverage from an 
employer). The Census Bureau estimates that Medicaid covered 19.5 percent of 
all individuals in 2014, up sharply from 17.5 percent in 2013 (Smith and Medalia 
2015). The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) gave states the option to expand 
eligibility for the program to all individuals up to 133 percent of the Federal Poverty 
Line. To date, 32 states including the District of Columbia have done so, and this 
eligibility expansion largely is responsible for the increase in Medicaid coverage. 
This increase is also evident in administrative data. According to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), more than 72 million low income adults 
and children were enrolled in the Medicaid program as of January 2016, an increase 
of nearly 15 million since implementation of the ACA (CMS 2016).
The ACA expanded Medicaid eligibility primarily for adults and in particular for 
adults without dependent children, and most of the increase in enrollment was from 
those populations. Projections suggest that up to 21.3 million low income adults 
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could  eventually gain coverage under the ACA Medicaid expansions (Stephens et al. 
2013).1 Given the large and increasing population served by the program, knowing 
how Medicaid and other public health insurance programs affect the labor supply of 
recipients and their family members, particularly that of adults without dependent 
children, has become increasingly important for understanding the total costs of the 
program.
Economic theory predicts that cash and in-kind transfer programs generally 
should reduce labor supply, and extensive empirical research typically has shown 
that such programs do indeed have the hypothesized effect (e.g., Moffitt 2002). 
However, the literature on Medicaid’s effect on the labor supply of low income 
parents is mixed. While some work finds strong work disincentives (Ellwood and 
Adams 1990, Moffitt and Wolfe 1992, and Dave et al. 2015), other papers find weaker 
disincentives or even positive incentives (Yelowitz 1995, Montgomery and Navin 
2000, Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2001, 2005, Hamersma and Kim 2009, Hamersma 
2013, and Strumpf 2011). These papers focus exclusively on pregnant women and 
parents, and the wide range of estimates arising from the existing literature suggests 
effects are heterogeneous across population and macroeconomic conditions studied.
A more relevant population to study given the current policy environment is low 
income non-elderly, nondisabled adults without dependent children (“childless 
adults”). We contribute to this literature by providing plausibly causal estimates of 
the effect of means-tested public insurance coverage on the employment of child-
less adults. Until the past few years, researchers have largely been unable to explore 
the effects of Medicaid eligibility on the labor supply of childless adults, as states 
have only recently begun extending coverage to this population. Garthwaite, Gross, 
and Notowidigdo (2014) examine eligibility contractions in Tennessee’s program 
(TennCare), which had been available to childless adults until July 2005, and find 
both large reductions in Medicaid coverage and large increases in employment rates 
among childless adults in Tennessee following this contraction. These results are 
consistent with a 60 percentage point reduction in employment stemming from 
the availability of public insurance. Baicker et al. (2014) examined the impacts of 
Medicaid on the employment of recipients through the Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment and found modest reductions in employment, of 1.6 percentage points, 
that are not statistically different from zero. Notably, and in keeping with the earlier 
literature, results from this newer work on childless adults are characterized by con-
siderable heterogeneity across population and economic context.
Because the size of the labor supply disincentive effects of public insurance 
likely vary with the economic environment, it is important to obtain a variety of 
estimates. This is especially true given the extreme divergent results found in the 
two recent papers discussed above (Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo 2014 and 
Baicker et al. 2014). Learning about the likely labor market effects of the ACA on 
low income childless adults is also of critical policy importance. The Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the ACA would reduce total labor market activ-
ity (as measured by the total number of hours worked) by roughly 1.5–2 percent, 
1 Approximately half of these projected new adults lived in states where, as of March 5, 2013, governors either 
had not yet decided to expand or opposed the Medicaid expansion. 
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 representing a decline of approximately 2 million full-time-equivalent workers. 
Moreover, the CBO attributes this projected decline primarily to a decrease in labor 
supply (Congressional Budget Office 2014).
In this study, we exploit a recent policy reversal in Wisconsin, during which a 
major public insurance expansion for childless adults was implemented and, sev-
eral months later, abruptly frozen. Individuals who applied after the program was 
frozen were placed on a waitlist. Those on the waitlist were supposed to have been 
allowed to enroll as space became available due to exits from the program, and it 
was generally understood in the months following the establishment of the waitlist 
that this was how it would operate. However, entry from the waitlist never occurred 
even as the Core Plan enrollment declined. We obtain estimates of the causal effect 
of Medicaid on the labor supply of childless adults by comparing the labor market 
outcomes of those who applied prior to the program freeze and received benefits to 
those who applied after the program freeze and did not receive benefits.
We use both a regression discontinuity design that employs the timing of the enroll-
ment suspension and waitlist introduction and a fixed effects  difference-in-differences 
model that fully exploits the strengths of our individual-level panel data and removes 
time-invariant unobserved differences between the two groups to estimate the size 
of these effects. An important challenge is that the waitlist was announced a few 
days prior to its implementation, inducing a large number of applications. We take 
numerous steps to address this issue. In addition to showing that estimates are robust 
to various alternative specifications, we show that there is no evidence of a differ-
ence in self-reported health needs for those who applied during that time nor is there 
evidence of differential prior health care usage between waitlisted applicants and 
recipients.
A particular strength of our study is that we rely on the state’s own adminis-
trative records rather than on self-reported enrollment, employment, and earnings 
data. The data for our study are Medicaid enrollment files merged with quarterly 
unemployment insurance earnings reports from Wisconsin. The Medicaid records 
allow us to observe all enrolled and waitlisted applicants, including their exact date 
of application. The unemployment insurance earnings records are from employer 
reporting to the state and allow us to observe quarterly wages from all employ-
ers, changes in employer, and any spells of nonemployment lasting more than one 
quarter. The large size of our matched administrative dataset allows us to explore 
whether effects are different for particular demographic subgroups, including age 
and sex, and whether they might vary across business cycles by looking at variation 
in local unemployment rates and effects on industrial employment, an important 
contribution given the heterogeneity in previous findings.
We find public insurance enrollment reduces the likelihood an adult in our sample 
will be employed by 5.2 percentage points and reduces net earnings by over $315 per 
quarter over the following nine quarters, according to our regression discontinuity 
estimates. Our fixed effects difference-in-difference estimates yield a similar effect 
size of a 5.3 percentage point reduction in employment and a $74 reduction in earn-
ings. The 95 percent confidence intervals for these estimates rule out either any pos-
itive effect or large negative effect of public health insurance on labor supply. Effects 
are largest for those with ages over 55, and there is evidence of  interaction between 
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 individual employment status and the local labor market conditions in whether pub-
lic insurance discourages work. These effect sizes are an order of magnitude smaller 
than those found by Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014) and are three times 
larger than those found by Baicker et al. (2014). Though much smaller than one 
estimate, our results show that enrollment of childless adults into public insurance 
can lead to economically and statistically meaningful reductions in labor supply.
I. Background
Launched in January 2009, Wisconsin’s BadgerCare Plus Core Plan provided 
health insurance to childless adults with household incomes below 200 percent of 
the Federal Poverty Line (FPL). The state of Wisconsin applied for and received 
a federal Section 1115 waiver to extend some health benefits to this population. 
Once enrolled, members received a managed care benefit package and faced lit-
tle cost-sharing. With few exceptions, coverage was not available to persons who 
already had any form of private health insurance, quit their job, or voluntarily 
dropped any health insurance in the 12 months prior to application. The program 
initially required a $60 application fee. Upon enrollment, members were eligible to 
receive benefits for a period of 12 months, when eligibility would be reevaluated.
Enrollment began January 1, 2009 for a limited group and opened to the public on 
July 1, 2009. Application levels immediately exceeded projections and program bud-
get, with enrollment reaching a high of 65,057. On October 5, 2009,  then-Governor 
Jim Doyle announced at a news conference that Core Plan applications would be 
suspended effective October 9, 2009 at noon. The suspension was stated by the 
governor to result from unanticipated demand for the program and was reported in 
newspapers statewide.
Eligible applications received after noon on October 9, 2009 were placed on a 
waitlist. Waitlisted applicants were not required to pay the application fee, and were 
told that once openings in Core were available they would be notified. The waitlist 
had reached 89,412 individuals by December 2010. The state has sought to decrease 
overall Core Plan enrollment to a sustainable level, and thus did not enroll waitlisted 
applicants as enrolled Core Plan members left the program. The only waitlisted 
applicants ever enrolled were a small number who were eligible for a medical wait-
list bypass because of cancer or heart disease.2 The presence of a waitlist, imposed 
quickly based only on state budget criteria and not on participant characteristics, 
provides a natural and ready comparison group for those enrolled in the Core Plan. 
Those on the waitlist wanted to and were eligible to enroll, but were not able to do 
so before the enrollment suspension went into effect. Names were not removed from 
the waitlist if later income should change.
2 A program with more limited benefits, called the BadgerCare Plus Basic Plan, was promised for waitlisted 
applicants at the time of the announcement. The Basic Plan was formally announced in January 2010 and cover-
age was eventually offered to those enrolled on the waitlist effective in July 2010. The state legislature required 
the Basic Plan to be self-supporting through premiums. Participants in Basic were required to remain eligible for 
the Core Plan; this meant, among other requirements, their incomes had to remain below the 200 percent FPL 
threshold. Enrollment in the Basic Plan reached a high of 6,013 in April 2011 (reflecting March applicants) and has 
steadily declined since then. 
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While outside the window of our study, Wisconsin chose not to participate in fed-
erally incentivized Medicaid expansions under the ACA. However, effective April 1, 
2014, all childless adults with income under 100 percent FPL were allowed to enroll 
in the Medicaid program and all adults with incomes over 100 percent FPL were 
required to transition out of the program, ending the BadgerCare Plus Core Plan. 
The net change in state program enrollment as of January 2016 relative to before 
ACA implementation has been an increase of 6.1 percent, while nationally enroll-
ment was up 26.5 percent (CMS 2016).3
II. Theory and Related Literature on Transfer Programs
A standard static labor supply model would predict that income eligibility thresh-
olds for public health insurance likely reduce the incentive to remain in or return 
to the workforce and, among workers, likely reduce the incentive to increase work 
hours. The negative effect on labor supply results from the reduced need for private 
coverage among recipients as well as the possibility that increased earnings would 
disqualify them from public coverage (the “Medicaid notch”).
As discussed above, the existing economics literature portrays a mixed picture 
of the impact of Medicaid eligibility on the labor supply of both low income par-
ents and childless adults. In contrast, the literature on other important publicly pro-
vided health insurance programs is more conclusive. French and Jones (2011) show 
Medicare eligibility is an important determinant of retirement decisions. Boyle and 
Lahey (2010) find decreased labor supply on both the extensive and intensive mar-
gins for older veterans eligible for Department of Veterans Affairs health programs.
An important distinction between the Wisconsin Core Plan for childless adults 
and Medicaid to childless adults in general is that following the imposition of the 
enrollment cap on October 9, 2009, the Core Plan was no longer an entitlement. 
That is, after October 9, 2009, any Core Plan member who left the plan (perhaps 
as a result of gaining health insurance through a new employer) would not be able 
to go back on the plan should he or she subsequently lose private insurance. This 
would not be the case with Medicaid; individuals would be free to exit and reenter 
the program as their eligibility changes. The fact that the Core Plan was not an enti-
tlement may have had a “lock-in” effect on enrollees, exacerbating any employment 
disincentive relative to that of Medicaid.
Other types of cash and in-kind transfer programs in the United States have been 
found to negatively affect labor supply. Moffitt (2002) reviews the extensive empir-
ical literature. More recently, Jacob and Ludwig (2012) find a 6 percent decline in 
labor force participation and a 10 percent decrease in earnings resulting from hous-
ing vouchers. Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) find reductions in employment and 
hours worked among single-headed households resulting from the food stamp pro-
gram. Meyer (2002) finds the Earned Income Tax Credit, which subsidizes work for 
low income families, encourages work for single mothers on the extensive but not on 
3 Those without access to affordable health insurance and with family incomes higher than 100 percent FPL 
could be eligible for premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions in Wisconsin’s federally facilitated health 
insurance exchange. 
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the intensive margin; Eissa and Hoynes (2004) find extensive margin work disincen-
tives for married couples. Social Security Disability Insurance has generally been 
found to reduce employment among older men (Bound 1989; Parsons 1991; Gruber 
and Kubik 1997; Chen and van der Klaauw 2008; Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 
2013; and French and Song 2014). Given differences across transfer programs in 
both size and income testing of the associated benefit, we must exercise caution in 
extrapolating results to the Medicaid context. That said, it is important to recognize 
that the broader literature on non-health-insurance-based transfer programs consis-
tently finds a negative association between program eligibility and labor supply.
The effect of Medicaid is ambiguous in our context. If availability of public insur-
ance leads to increased job mobility and increased mobility results in better job 
matches, we could, all else equal, observe higher wages (and therefore earnings) 
among the public insurance enrollees. A second possibility is that workers could 
match with jobs that pay higher wages since the job would no longer need to pay 
health benefits. Baicker and Chandra (2006) find increases in health insurance pre-
miums result in both a decreased probability of employment and lower wages, sup-
porting a partial wage offset for health insurance. Since we do not observe hours 
worked, only quarterly earnings, in practice, earnings could either increase (because 
of better matches and/or wage offsets) or decrease (because of fewer hours worked). 
Again, since workers must remain below the income eligibility threshold, the posi-
tive effects are likely limited. Another possibility is that the availability of Medicaid 
could improve health, reducing the disutility of work and increasing labor supply.
Finally, increased availability of public insurance may increase the likelihood a 
worker would become self-employed. Consistent with a compensating differential 
framework, the self-employment wage is effectively increased by the value of public 
insurance coverage. Results from the empirical literature are mixed (Lombard 2001; 
Holtz-Eakin, Penrod, and Rosen 1996; Zissimopoulos and Karoly 2007; and Fairlie, 
Kapur, and Gates 2011); however, we acknowledge the possibility and discuss it 
further below.
III. Data
The data sources for this project are state administrative records on enrolled and 
waitlisted Core Plan applicants and earnings records from Wisconsin’s unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) system. In the state’s records on Core Plan enrollees and wait-
listed applicants, we observe exact application date, age in months, monthly income 
at the time of application, county of residence, and sex. The UI data include quar-
terly earnings for each individual from each covered firm where he or she worked 
during that quarter, as well as the four-digit North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) industry code for the firm. Only employers not subject to unem-
ployment insurance laws (for example, the self-employed) are exempt from the 
reporting requirement. We observe these data for each person from the first quarter 
of 2005 (2005:I) through the final quarter of 2011 (2011:IV). We merge the data on 
Core Plan applicants and enrollees to the UI data using Social Security numbers.
A particular strength of our analysis is that UI data exhibit superior accuracy 
over the survey-based data used in the existing literature. Virtually all employers 
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are required to file quarterly wage reports for each employee on their payrolls. The 
wage reports include the employee’s Social Security number and quarterly wages 
and the employer’s federal tax identification number and industry classification 
code. Using these data, we can track quarterly earnings and employment at all cov-
ered firms, changes in employer, and any periods of nonemployment lasting for at 
least one quarter.
We consider several outcomes to measure labor supply using the quarterly employ-
ment records available in the UI data. For employment, we consider average quar-
terly employment over the 2009:IV to 2011:IV period, with employment defined as 
having any earnings in a quarter, reflecting all available quarters in the  post-waitlist 
era. We also present results that treat employment in each quarter separately in order 
to consider how the behavior of applicants may have changed over time, since their 
beliefs about whether they would ever get insurance may have changed and this 
would not be reflected in the average outcome. Earnings are defined as average 
earnings over 2009:IV to 2011:IV. For the difference-in-differences models and for 
tests of the regression discontinuity assumption as described below, these outcomes 
are defined analogously for the preprogram period.
The time period of the analysis includes the Great Recession, and Wisconsin was 
no exception to the nation’s overall poor economic performance during this time. It 
is possible that the recession influenced the likelihood that those reentering the labor 
force changed industries, which may be more costly than a typical job transition, 
and therefore suppressed labor supply among those who received the insurance rel-
ative to a non-recessionary period. For this reason, and to explore differences in our 
results relative to other recent work, we include analyses by local unemployment 
rate in 2009 and by industry. The source for the local unemployment data is the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.
When examining industry, we aggregate to two digit NAICS codes and identify 
the top five industries for tractability. These industries are: Accommodation and 
Food Services (code 72); Retail Trade (codes 44 – 45); Administrative and Support 
and Waste Management and Remediation Services (code 56); Manufacturing 
(codes 31–33); and Health Care and Social Assistance (code 62). We classify indi-
viduals employed at more than one firm during a quarter as employed in the industry 
from which they received the majority of their wages.
Waitlist members were subject to basic screening, but to ensure comparability we 
employ several sample filters to confirm those on the waitlist would have actually 
been eligible for the Core Plan had they been invited to enroll (on the basis of all 
characteristics other than earnings, which may have changed in response to being 
on the waitlist). First, we drop anyone not in the eligibility age range (ages 19–64) 
according to date of birth. Second, we observe termination codes (reasons) for wait-
list members that are removed from the waitlist, and we drop all waitlist members 
with codes indicating they either do not meet program requirements or are eligible 
for other Medicaid programs. We do not observe Core Plan applicants who applied 
before the program cutoff and were found ineligible by the state.
Table 1 reports demographic characteristics as well as pre-period and post-period 
outcomes for two groups: all Core and waitlist applications in our sample, regardless 
of application date, and just those who applied within 30 days of October 9, 2009. 
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We note that while Core recipients had to apply between June 15 and October 9, 
2009, waitlist applications in our data could take place anytime between October 9, 
2009 and mid-2011. Overall, individuals who enrolled in the Core Plan are aged 
43.6 on average and 49.6 percent were female, while the average age for those on 
the waitlist was lower—39 years—and 43 percent were female. If we examine only 
those who applied within about a month of the October 9 cutoff date (i.e., those who 
enrolled into Core between September 1, 2009 and October 2, 2009 and those who 
were waitlisted and applied between October 9, 2009 and October 31, 2009), these 
differences are smaller. Employment across the top five industries is very similar for 
the two groups.
The average Core enrollee was slightly less likely to be employed in the second 
quarter of 2009 than the average waitlisted applicant, and had lower average earn-
ings; again, these differences are smaller in the subset of applicants who applied 
within 30 days of waitlist implementation. Figure 1 plots quarterly employment 
rates for those enrolled in the Core Plan and those waitlisted from 2005:I to 2011:IV 
for all individuals who applied within 30 days of the cutoff date. The first plot of 
Figure 1 (panel A) illustrates the simple unweighted average employment of the two 
Table 1—Demographic Characteristics, Core Plan Enrollees versus Waitlisted Applicants
Core plan 
enrollees
Waitlisted 
applicants p-value
Mean SD Mean SD
Ever applied
Age 43.6 13.5 38.9 13.4 0.000
Female 49.6% 0.500 43.0% 0.496 0.000
Percent employed, 2009:II 43.2% 0.495 48.3% 0.500 0.000
Average quarterly earnings, 2009:II 1,247 2,174 1,828 3,000 0.000
Percent accommodation and food service, 2005:I–2009:II 9.5% 0.22 9.2% 0.21 0.054
Percent retail trade, 2005:I–2009:II 8.5% 0.20 8.3% 0.20 0.177
Percent administration and support and waste management, 
 2005:I–2009:II
6.9% 0.16 6.8% 0.15 0.250
Percent manufacturing, 2005:I–2009:II 7.8% 0.21 8.2% 0.22 0.001
Percent health care and social assistance, 2005:I–2009:II 5.6% 0.18 5.0% 0.18 0.000
Average employment, 2009:IV–2011:IV 42.8% 0.41 48.3% 0.38 0.001
Average earnings, 2009:IV–2011:IV 1,509 2,098 1,724 2,141 0.000
Observations 42,401 60,507
Applied within 30 days of october 9, 2009
Age 42.2 13.5 39.1 13.2 0.000
Female 46.9% 0.499 44.8% 0.497 0.032
Percent employed, 2009:II 44.7% 0.497 48.3% 0.500 0.000
Average quarterly earnings, 2009:II 1,449 2,649 1,625 2,711 0.001
Percent accommodation and food service, 2005:I–2009:II 9.5% 0.21 9.9% 0.21 0.401
Percent retail trade, 2005:I–2009:II 8.3% 0.19 9.0% 0.20 0.087
Percent administration and support and waste management,
 2005:I–2009:II
6.8% 0.15 7.2% 0.15 0.266
Percent manufacturing, 2005:I–2009:II 8.2% 0.22 8.3% 0.22 0.812
Percent health care and social assistance, 2005:I–2009:II 5.0% 0.17 4.9% 0.17 0.855
Average employment, 2009:IV–2011:IV 43.7% 0.40 49.4% 0.39 0.000
Average earnings, 2009:IV–2011:IV 1,562 2,132 1,816 2,241 0.000
Observations 10,528 3,396
Notes: The table shows means and standard deviations of selected characteristics, along with the p-values for a 
 two-tailed test of the difference in means. Age and sex are from application data. Average employment, earnings, 
and industry are constructed from unemployment insurance reporting data.
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Figure 1. Average Employment by Quarter, Core versus Waitlist
Notes: Panel A shows average quarterly employment for all applicants by Core versus waitlist status. Panel B shows 
the same outcome with observations weighted by the propensity score. Panel C shows the raw estimated difference 
in the probability of employment with 95 percent confidence intervals, where the estimate treats each quarter as a 
separate outcome in the regression discontinuity design. 
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groups. The  second plot (panel B) weights observations by an estimated propensity 
score (details of which are provided in the section on the difference-in-differences 
estimates). The final plot (panel C) in Figure 1 shows the estimated difference in the 
two groups’ employment status treating each quarter separately. In particular, we 
use the regression discontinuity design described in the next section and by equa-
tion (1), so that the dot above 2005:I represents the point estimate of the difference 
between the Core and waitlist groups in the first quarter of 2005, while the line rep-
resents the standard error on the estimate, and equivalently for each other quarter in 
turn. We implement this at a bandwidth of 20 days with no covariate adjustments.
A few things should be noted from Figure 1. First, Core Plan enrollees and wait-
listed enrollees both suffered large declines in employment rates around 2009:II–III, 
bottoming out in about 2010:I, suggesting that employment losses (and perhaps loss 
of employer sponsored insurance coverage) led many to apply to the Core Plan. 
Second, Core Plan enrollees tended to have slightly lower average employment 
rates in the quarters leading up to the date when enrollment into the plan opened 
in July 1, 2009 than did waitlisted applicants, suggesting some statistical adjust-
ment or quasi-experimental design is needed. Third, waitlisted applicants had higher 
employment rates in the quarters following the cutoff date, suggesting a substantial 
employment disincentive effect of public insurance. Finally, Figure 1 makes clear 
that in both the propensity score adjusted comparison and the regression discon-
tinuity design, there are no statistically significant differences in pre-period labor 
market outcomes; all differences in the two groups begin after the difference in their 
insurance coverage begins in the third quarter of 2009.
IV. Regression Discontinuity Estimation
Our main approach in identifying the effect of the Core Plan on the labor supply 
of childless adults is a regression discontinuity design. Lee and Lemieux (2010) 
provide an overview and summary of recent applications. In essence, this approach 
involves comparing the labor supply of those who applied just prior to October 9, 
2009 (immediately before the enrollment cap was implemented) with the labor sup-
ply of those who applied just after October 9, 2009 (immediately after the enrollment 
cap was set). As discussed above, eligible applicants who applied prior to October 9 
were enrolled into the program while those who applied after October 9 were placed 
on a waiting list. Because all eligible people who applied before October 9 were 
allowed to enroll in the Core Plan and none who applied after were, we use a “sharp” 
regression discontinuity design.
Importantly, the date was announced precipitously (on October 5) and would have 
been unexpected by all potential applicants. However, the data show the announce-
ment resulted in an increase in applications between October 5 and October 9. Online 
Appendix Figure 1 makes clear the increase in applications during the last week.4 
4 We can also see in online Appendix Figure 1 that applications were allowed on weekends during the post-pe-
riod and not during the pre-period, resulting in an increase on Mondays. Documentation from the time indicates that 
the computer system used for Core Plan applications processed them the next business day if received after 4:30 pm 
or on a weekend. When the waitlist was initiated, the State was unable to use the same system and initially recorded 
applications in a spreadsheet, and applications appear to have been recorded on the day in which they occurred, 
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Our preferred specifications use only the data on enrollees up to the announcement 
date and exclude an equal interval before and after the waitlist implementation date 
(applications from October 5–October 14 are discarded with the implicit assump-
tion that applications were displaced from just after the ninth to just before).5
The RD approach enjoys a distinct advantage over simple comparisons of those 
enrolled in the Core Plan with those on the waiting list. Since the cutoff date was 
imposed arbitrarily by the state (and was not an original feature of the program), it 
is reasonable to assume the individuals applying just before the announced cutoff 
date were very similar to those applying just after the cutoff date. The standard 
RD identification assumption applies, and in this context is interpreted as: there 
is no self-selection into application based on the knowledge the applicant will be 
on the waitlist rather than gain immediate insurance. We implement our estimates 
using a local linear regression approach. We include robustness checks to various 
bandwidths as part of our analysis. The standard validity checks are included in the 
online Appendix and are discussed in more detail in the results section.
The exact specification of our RD estimator is
(1)  y i = α + θ ( X i −  x 0 ) + τ  W i + γ  ( X i −  x 0 )  W i +  ϵ i ,
with triangular kernel weights, where all observations outside the bandwidth h 
(more than  h away from  x 0 ) are discarded. Here,  y i is the outcome under consider-
ation;  X i is the date of application;  x 0 is the cutoff date;  W i is an indicator for whether 
or not the individual was enrolled in Medicaid (equals zero if on the waitlist, one 
if in Core); and  ϵ i is a random error term. The treatment effect of interest is  τ . The 
coefficients  θ and  γ allow the slope of the regression to differ on either side of the 
cutoff  x 0 .
For the main analysis, we select a bandwidth of 20 days, which includes appli-
cations from September 15–October 4 and October 15–November 3. Because the 
announcement prior to the actual application cutoff date makes the identification less 
straightforward than might be desired, we take several further steps.6 First, we per-
form numerous robustness checks involving alternative choices of included applica-
tion dates, including specifications that include applications between October 5 and 
9. These are included at the end of this section. Second, we also provide estimates 
based on a second approach: matched and unmatched  difference-in-differences 
models with individual fixed effects. We discuss these models and their results in 
Section VI.
including weekends. This motivates controls for day of week of application. We also estimated models defined by 
application week (Saturday–Friday) rather than day. Results are very similar and available upon request. 
5 This is similar to the “donut-RD” estimate studied in Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell (2016) as a solution to heap-
ing bias. We have performed additional analyses that allow for varying periods of displacement. In particular, we 
excluded applications up to two weeks, three weeks, and four weeks after the waitlist; in addition, we performed a 
simulation that studies the implications of redistributing the surge applications throughout the post-period. We give 
individuals their actual labor supply to be conservative; since they did receive the program but we classify them as 
not receiving it, this should bias against finding a result. The size of the coefficient in each analysis is very similar 
to that obtained by the one week analysis. These results are available upon request. 
6 Specifically, we might be concerned the announcement is a form of manipulation and affects waitlisted 
 applicants in the post-period in addition to those who enrolled during the few days between the announcement and 
the suspension of enrollment. 
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A. regression Discontinuity results
The first outcome we examine is the probability of employment, defined as the 
fraction of quarters with nonzero earnings from the fourth quarter of 2009 to the last 
quarter of 2011.7 Results of the estimation are summarized in the first row of the first 
column of Table 2. At the reported bandwidth of 20 days, the point estimate is a dif-
ference of −5.2 percentage points in the specification that includes covariates (sex, 
employment in prior quarter, earnings in prior quarter, age modeled with indicators 
for every five years, and indicators for day of week of application), which is statisti-
cally different from zero at the 5 percent level. In other words, Core recipients who 
had access to public health insurance were just over 5 percentage points less likely 
to be employed after getting that insurance relative to waitlisted applicants who did 
not get access. Relative to the average second quarter of 2009 employment of Core 
recipients who applied within 30 days (44.7 percent), this is a 12 percent reduction 
in labor supply. We note that as seen in Figure 1, both Core recipients and waitlisted 
applicants were increasing their labor supply throughout most of this period; as 
such, this relative difference means that the waitlisted applicants increased their 
labor supply by a larger amount, not necessarily that Core recipients were quitting 
jobs or reducing hours worked.
Figure 2 illustrates the results of our local linear RD specification for this out-
come. We plot the assignment variable (day of application) on the x-axis and the 
outcome variable (average quarterly employment from 2009:IV to 2011:IV) on the 
y-axis. Each observation is the average of the outcome for all applicants on that day 
and the lines are the estimated local linear regression functions (with no adjustment 
for covariates). Like the regression analysis, this plot excludes the week prior to 
and after the cutoff day. The figure shows application dates within the 20-day band-
width, from September 15 to October 4 and from October 15 to November 3. The 
difference in average employment between the Core recipients and waitlisted appli-
cants is made obvious in this figure, consistent with the results presented in Table 2.
Figure 2 also includes a bandwidth robustness illustration for this specification, 
which shows the effect of changing the number of days around the cutoff date that 
are included in the local linear estimation. Because of the tradeoff between higher 
variability at lower bandwidths and potential bias from including data too far from 
the relevant threshold at higher bandwidths, we show the results as a function of this 
parameter to assure the reader that the results are not dependent in an important way 
on the exact interval. In this, the x-axis is the bandwidth at which the specification 
was estimated, while the y-axis is the size of the estimate. The solid dark line rep-
resents the estimate itself, and the lighter dashed lines represent the 95 percent con-
fidence interval for the estimate. After some variability at the smallest bandwidths, 
the point estimate is robust to changing the exact bandwidth used for estimation. 
Increasing the bandwidth decreases the standard error on the estimate but does not 
change the point estimate in a meaningful way.
7 We have also performed the estimation excluding the final quarter of 2009 with nearly identical results. 
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Table 2 also includes a specification that does not include observable  pretreatment 
covariates in the second column. The inclusion of covariates should not change 
the point estimate if the identification assumption behind the regression disconti-
nuity design holds. Including covariates also increases precision of the estimates. 
When we do not include covariates the estimate is −5.5 percentage points and is 
 statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level. This is almost identical to 
Table 2—Summary of Regression Discontinuity Results, Employment Outcomes
Average quarterly 
employment rate, 
2009:IV–2011:IV
Ever employed, 
2010
First-differenced 
employment rate
Average quarterly 
earnings, 
2009:IV–2011:IV
Regression discontinuity −0.052 −0.055 −0.056 −0.059 −0.069 −0.079 −315.9 −314.2
 estimate (0.025) (0.029) (0.033) (0.036) (0.028) (0.028) (150.3) (164)
Female 0.084 0.066 0.038 160.8
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (58.4)
Earnings 2009:II ($1,000s) 0.002 −0.006 −0.014 233.1
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (70.5)
Employed 2009:II 0.369 0.405 0.015 768.4
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (226.2)
Age controls (19–24 excluded)
 [24–29) 0.005 −0.022 −0.173 319
(0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (99.5)
 [29–34) −0.016 −0.030 −0.214 268.6
(0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (118.1)
 [34–39) −0.036 −0.066 −0.219 146.6
(0.024) (0.031) (0.025) (136.6)
 [39–44) −0.067 −0.113 −0.276 168.3
(0.024) (0.031) (0.026) (147.1)
 [44–49) −0.107 −0.133 −0.274 −21.64
(0.022) (0.028) (0.023) (126.5)
 [49–54) −0.136 −0.195 −0.325 −264.3
(0.020) (0.026) (0.030) (114.1)
 [54–59) −0.164 −0.243 −0.329 −386.5
(0.021) (0.027) (0.024) (118.2)
 [59–64) −0.178 −0.243 −0.321 −455.4
(0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (124.9)
 64+ −0.355 −0.479 −0.476 −1,252.7
(0.038) (0.053) (0.057) (161.4)
Application day of week
 indicators
X X X X
mean of outcome variable
In-sample waitlist 0.490 0.629 −0.043 1,816.6
In-sample core 0.425 0.563 −0.093 1,489.6
Observations 6,064 6,064  6,064 6,064
Notes: Table displays regression discontinuity estimates of effect of getting the Core Plan, with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. All estimates exclude one week prior to and following the waitlist implementation. Slope 
coefficients for assignment variable are not included in the table. Average quarterly employment rate is defined as 
the fraction of quarters with nonzero earnings. First-differenced employment rate is calculated as the difference 
in average quarterly employment in the post-period (2009:IV to 2011:IV) and the pre-period (2005:I to 2009:II). 
Results calculated at a bandwidth of 20 days. Figures 2–4 illustrate data for average quarterly employment rate, 
first-differenced employment rate, average quarterly earnings, and show bandwidth robustness. Bandwidths are 
defined as distance from excluded interval. 
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and not statistically different from the result including covariates and supports the 
previous conclusion.
In order to consider how our results would look if measured on an annual basis, 
we also include in Table 2 the outcome “Ever Employed, 2010.” This variable is 
zero if the person was not employed in each quarter of 2010, and 1 if the person 
had positive earnings in any quarter in 2010. Point estimates are slightly larger, at 
−0.056, but are not statistically different from the quarterly outcome.
Following Lemieux and Milligan (2008), we also include a first-differenced 
version of the regression discontinuity design. This specification of the regression 
 discontinuity design effectively incorporates individual fixed effects by comparing 
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Figure 2. Employment Rate by Day of Application
Notes: Panel A shows the average quarterly employment rate by each day of application and includes the estimated 
local linear functions superimposed on the data. Estimation results are in Table 2. The figure shows application 
dates within the 20-day bandwidth, from September 15 to October 4 and from October 15 to November 3. Panel B 
shows the regression discontinuity estimate of the difference and the estimated 95 percent confidence interval as a 
function of the number of days included on either side of the threshold. 
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the employment of the same individuals before and after they were or were not able 
to enroll into the Core Plan. We define the y-variable as the difference in average 
employment in the post-period (2009:IV to 2011:IV) and the pre-period (2005:I 
to 2009:II). Figure 3 illustrates the results of this specification and Table 2 lists the 
coefficient and standard error. The coefficient at a bandwidth of 20 days is −0.069 
with a standard error of 0.028 (statistically significant at the 1 percent level), very 
similar to, although slightly larger than, the non-differenced results. This coefficient 
is robust to alternative bandwidths as shown in Figure 3. Results are the same when 
the pre-period is defined with a symmetric number of quarters.
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Figure 3. Employment Rate by Day of Application, First-Differenced
Notes: Panel A shows the difference in average quarterly employment rate, defined as average employment from 
2009:IV to 2011:IV, average employment from 2005:I to 2009:II, by each day of application, and includes the esti-
mated local linear functions superimposed on the data. Estimation results are in Table 2. The figure shows appli-
cation dates within the 20-day bandwidth, from September 15 to October 4 and from October 15 to November 3. 
Panel B shows the regression discontinuity estimate of the difference and the estimated 95 percent confidence inter-
val as a function of the number of days included on either side of the threshold. 
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The next outcome we consider is average quarterly earnings. We note that these 
are net earnings; a relative reduction in earnings among those who received the insur-
ance benefit would be expected if, for example, wage rates remained the same and 
Medicaid enrollees were less likely to work (as discussed above, we are unable to 
observe wages directly). Results for this outcome are included in Table 2. The aver-
age earnings of waitlisted applicants is higher than that of Medicaid enrollees; the 
results suggest that the negative earnings effect of Medicaid is just over $315 per 
quarter, on average. Again, this effect includes any changes on the intensive margin 
(changing hours of work or wage rates) as well as the extensive margin (becoming 
employed). Relative to the second quarter of 2009 baseline earnings of $1,449 for the 
Core Plan recipients who applied within 30 days, this is a 22 percent decline. Results 
from the model not including covariates are almost identical.
Figure 4 shows estimated local linear regression functions for determining the 
effect of public insurance participation on quarterly earnings. The dependent vari-
able on the y-axis is the average total quarterly wage and salary earnings from 
2009:IV to 2011:IV. We again plot the assignment variable (day of application) on 
the x-axis. Each observation is the average of the outcome for all applicants on that 
day, and the plot excludes the week prior to and after the cutoff day. Figure 4 shows 
a clear difference in average earnings between those who applied prior to the cutoff 
date and were able to obtain the insurance and those who applied too late, consistent 
with the estimates reported in Table 2. Figure 4 also includes a bandwidth robust-
ness illustration for the estimated difference in employment; we find that the point 
estimate is very stable and consistent across bandwidths.
The final set of outcomes we examine is related to industry of employment. As 
discussed above, it is possible that the recession influenced the likelihood that those 
reentering the labor force changed industries, which may be more costly than a typ-
ical job transition. We consider the average quarterly probability of being employed 
in each of the top five industries. At the 20-day bandwidth presented in Table 3, we 
find a statistically significant difference for one industry. For Retail Trade, there 
was a 3.5 percentage point decrease in the quarterly probability that someone on 
the Core Plan was employed in a job in that industry relative to someone on the 
waitlist. This estimate is stable across bandwidths and is statistically different from 
zero at larger and smaller bandwidths. For Manufacturing, we find a 2 percentage 
point decrease in Core employment in the industry relative to the waitlist, which is 
not statistically significant, although it is close; however, this estimate is not stable 
across bandwidths; it shrinks and is statistically zero at slightly smaller and at larger 
bandwidths, suggesting that it may reflect random error rather than a true effect.
Relative to the nation as a whole, Wisconsin consistently has a much higher pro-
portion of its labor force employed in Manufacturing (approximately 20 percent) 
and a lower proportion in Administrative and Support and Waste Management and 
Remediation Services (approximately 6 percent).8 The proportions employed in the 
other three top industries are very similar to the national average. Among these top 
five industries for our population, Manufacturing was by far the industry hardest 
8 Authors’ tabulations from Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
2005–2012. Industry references are to two-digit NAICS codes. 
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hit in Wisconsin during this time period (as measured by total employment); how-
ever, there is only weak evidence of differential reentry into this industry due to 
receipt of public health insurance. Wisconsin also saw a decline in total Retail Trade 
employment, and we do find that reentry into this industry was less likely for those 
who received public health insurance. In summary, there is some evidence that the 
recession may have played a role in employment dynamics as two out of the top five 
industries which saw the largest declines in employment were also those for which 
there is some evidence of differential employment by public health insurance status.
We also considered whether differential rates of employer health insurance 
provision might have influenced the likelihood of reentry into these industries. 
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Figure 4. Earnings by Day of Application
Notes: Panel A shows the average quarterly earnings by each day of application and includes the estimated local lin-
ear functions superimposed on the data. Estimation results are in Table 2. The figure shows application dates within 
the 20-day bandwidth, from September 15 to October 4 and from October 15 to November 3. Panel B shows the 
regression discontinuity estimate of the difference and the estimated 95 percent confidence interval as a function of 
the number of days included on either side of the threshold. 
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We used the 2010 Current Population Survey March Supplement to calculate the 
percentage of full-time workers without dependents ages 19–64 in Wisconsin who 
were covered by health insurance from their employer for the industry defini-
tions closest to our top five industries.9 We found that the most likely to have 
9 The 2010 Current Population Survey does not use NAICS codes to classify industry. 
Table 3—Summary of Regression Discontinuity Results, Industry Outcomes
Accommodation 
and food
service
Retail 
trade
Administrative 
and support
and waste 
management 
and remediation Manufacturing
Health care
and social 
assistance
Regression discontinuity 0.015 −0.035 0.014 −0.020 −0.008
 estimate (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Female 0.029 0.032 −0.025 −0.033 0.085
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Earnings 2009:II ($1,000s) −0.006 −0.002 −0.003 0.002 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Employed 2009:II 0.102 0.069 0.044 0.024 0.045
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Age controls (19–24 excluded)
[24–29) 0.01 −0.017 0.014 0.01 −0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013)
[29−34) −0.002 −0.052 0.022 0.028 −0.014
(0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014)
[34 –39) −0.005 −0.048 0.015 0.029 −0.018
(0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
[39– 44) −0.058 −0.044 0.017 0.035 −0.028
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
[44– 49) −0.037 −0.079 0.000 0.024 −0.015
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015)
[49–54) −0.048 −0.058 0.013 0.013 −0.033
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013)
[54–59) −0.066 −0.058 −0.002 0.011 −0.016
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014)
[59–64) −0.052 −0.055 −0.025 0.012 −0.035
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014)
64+ −0.058 −0.086 −0.057 −0.002 −0.071
(0.028) (0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015)
Application day of week
 indicators
X X X X X
mean of outcome variable
In-sample waitlist 0.083 0.081 0.088 0.044 0.066
In-sample core 0.078 0.064 0.075 0.04 0.061
Observations 6,064 6,064 6,064 6,064 6,064
Notes: The table displays regression discontinuity estimates of effect of getting the Core Plan, with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. All estimates exclude one week prior to and following the waitlist implementation. Slope 
coefficients for assignment variable are not included in the table. All outcomes are calculated as the fraction of quar-
ters during which an individual was employed in that particular industry. Results are calculated at a bandwidth of 
20 days. Bandwidths are defined as distance from excluded interval.
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health insurance from their employer were, in order, Manufacturing (79 per-
cent), Education, Health, and Social Services (70 percent), Administrative and 
Waste Management (67 percent), Wholesale/Retail Trade (59 percent), and Arts, 
Accommodation, and Food Services (44 percent). There is no evidence that work-
ers who did not receive insurance were more motivated to get a job in an industry 
more likely to provide insurance.
B. Subgroup Analysis
Table 4 reports the results of the regression discontinuity estimation for employ-
ment, and earnings for several splits of the sample: by sex, by age, by employment 
status prior to application, and by local unemployment rate. The table includes only 
the specification that excludes October 5 to October 14 applications and all results 
are reported at a bandwidth of 20 days.
Table 4—Regression Discontinuity Results, by Subsample
Average employment, 
2009:IV–2011:IV
Average earnings, 
2009:IV–2011:IV Observations
All (benchmark) −0.052 −315.9 6,064
(0.026) (150.3)
Women −0.081 −540.7 2,806
(0.037) (224.7)
Men −0.034 −147.8 3,258
(0.035) (206.8)
Age < 35 0.034 111.3 2,541
(0.037) (194.7)
Age 35–55 −0.102 −642.8 2,367
(0.042) (255.0)
Age > 55 −0.176 −827.2 1,156
(0.062) (432.2)
Employed at application 0.038 −55.32 1,881
(0.047) (284.1)
Unemployed at application −0.070 −395.3 4,183
(0.032) (202.4)
High unemployment county (>10%) −0.055 −383.1 1,493
(0.061) (386.9)
Low unemployment county (<=10%) −0.045 −295.2 4,469
(0.034) (188.2)
High UE county × employed 0.08 73.13 463
(−0.098) (573.8)
High UE county × unemployed −0.06 −391.4 1,030
(0.063) (505.2)
Low UE county × employed −0.008 −223.3 1,383
(−0.051) (324.5)
Low UE county × unemployed −0.074 −394.5 3,086
(0.037) (214.2)
Notes: The table displays regression discontinuity estimates of effect of getting the Core Plan, with robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. All results calculated at a bandwidth of 20 days, for specification excluding October 5–
October 14, and includes as controls the covariates in Table 2 not used as outcomes (age controls linear). 
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When we divide the sample by sex, we find that point estimates are slightly larger 
for women (−8.1 percentage points) than for men (−3.4 percentage points). For 
age, we separated the sample into three groups, those less than 35, those 35–55, and 
those older than 55. Split this way, there are clear and important differences in the 
estimated employment effect by age. The effect is approximately twice as large as 
the average for those between 35 and 55 years old (−10.2 percentage points), and 
more than three times as large as average for those over the age of 55 (−17.6 per-
centage points). For those under 35, effects are weakly positive (meaning that 
employment among Core Plan enrollees increased relative to those on the waitlist), 
although these are not statistically different from zero. These results are consistent 
with an early retirement story for older workers who may have found it more diffi-
cult to obtain a new job, and lost a valuable incentive to search when they obtained 
health insurance through the Core Plan. In contrast, younger workers on the waitlist 
may have chosen to search longer for a job that provided benefits, since they did not 
have insurance available to them; however, we cannot know, with the data available 
to us, whether or not jobs provided benefits.
The point estimate for those who were not employed at the time of application to 
the Core Plan is −7 percentage points, while the coefficient is positive although not 
statistically significant for those who were employed at the time of application. While 
effect sizes are not particularly different for the average applicant living in a high 
versus low unemployment county (split at 10 percent, the seventy-fifth percentile 
unemployment rate weighted by individual), in case of potential interactions between 
the local labor market and an applicant’s prior employment status, we also looked at 
the subsample of employed and non-employed applicants who were living in high or 
low unemployment counties at the time of application. These results are also shown 
in Table 4. There are no differences across the Core/waitlist for the employed in low 
unemployment counties, but for the non-employed in low unemployment counties 
there is a large and statistically significant difference: Core recipients were 7.4 per-
centage points less likely to be employed in the post-period on average. For employed 
workers in high unemployment counties, the coefficient is large and positive but not 
statistically different from zero, and for the unemployed workers in high unem-
ployment counties, the effect is similar in magnitude to the average. These effects 
are all stable across bandwidths and more precisely estimated at larger bandwidths.
On average, we calculated that employed workers had very similar employment 
rates in the post-period if they were in low unemployment (68.8 percent) or in 
high unemployment (69.0 percent) counties, while the non-employed workers had 
slightly higher employment rates in low unemployment counties (26.6 percent) than 
in high unemployment counties (25.8 percent). Taken together, these results support 
the idea that there is no effect on labor supply for the non-employed in bad labor 
markets; they may find it difficult to get a job regardless of whether they have health 
insurance or not; while for the non-employed in low unemployment counties, there 
are enough jobs available for the health insurance to make a difference in marginal 
incentives to participate in the labor market. Employed workers in high unemploy-
ment counties were also more likely to lose their job in the post-period than those 
in low unemployment counties, again giving the health insurance a chance to affect 
marginal incentives for the unemployed.
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C. regression Discontinuity Specification Checks
The potential for bias exists if, for example, an unobserved characteristic such 
as “preference for health insurance” is driving exact application timing. We expect 
that those with the strongest preference for insurance would have signed up immedi-
ately upon program availability, and there were indeed a large number of signups in 
June and July. These are not included in any of the RD specifications since they are 
outside of the bandwidths. The preference is likely to be decreasing with the time 
of program availability, but for the preference for health insurance to bias the RD 
results, it would need to be different across the cutoff date. One possibility is that 
waitlisted applicants are differentially less concerned about qualifying for the pro-
gram, and so they might be less inclined to keep incomes low in order to continue to 
stay income-eligible for the program.10 Since we find that waitlisted applicants are 
more likely to be employed, this type of bias would suggest we are finding this too 
often, overstating the result. On the other hand, waitlisted applicants might be pro-
crastinators, and perhaps thus lower quality workers, which might lead us to think 
the results are understated. These differences in behavior must be due to inherent 
differences in the applicants’ preferences in order to bias the results; differences in 
behavior due to getting or not getting the insurance are part of the treatment effect. 
While we are unable to test for violations of the identification assumption directly, 
we provide several validity checks in this section in addition to those included as 
part of the results discussed above (bandwidth robustness and exclusion of covari-
ates in the regressions).
One standard check is to test whether the density of observations as a function 
of the assignment variable is continuous through the discontinuity threshold. While 
this check is neither necessary nor sufficient for a valid regression discontinuity 
design (McCrary 2008), it can be suggestive as to whether the identifying assump-
tion is violated. As discussed above, the surge in applications in the last week means 
that the density of observations in our data (shown in online Appendix Figure 1) is 
not continuous through October 9. As explained, we take the approach of leaving 
out the data just prior to and after October 9, assuming that applications were fully 
displaced from the week prior. We also estimate the main specifications including 
all applications and by leaving out just the announcement week. We include illus-
trations of these specifications as online Appendix Figure 2 (employment outcome) 
and online Appendix Figure 3 (earnings outcome) and report the results in online 
Appendix Table 1. Results are the same direction as the main results, but are larger, 
and the inclusion of covariates makes a large difference in the size of the estimate, 
suggesting that these specifications are not preferred.
10 Another possibility is that the distribution mechanism itself could influence the labor supply decisions of 
affected participants. If, alternatively, the waitlist participants we use as a control group for Medicaid recipients are 
themselves constrained by the waitlist because, for example, they believe they need to remain eligible for the pro-
gram in order to eventually receive it, this would bias against us finding any effects. Most of the literature on waiting 
lists relates to allocation of medical care. Propper (1990, 1995) points out that there are costs to using waiting lists 
as mechanisms for medical care allocation in the United Kingdom and estimates these costs using contingent valua-
tion. Globerman (1991) discusses the potential for decreases in productivity due to waiting times. These studies do 
not examine a random allocation mechanism as an alternative choice. Cullis, Jones, and Propper (2000) provide a 
general treatment of the theoretical and empirical literature on waiting lists for health care services. 
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Online Appendix Table 2 reports the results of testing whether predetermined 
characteristics of the applicants were continuous throughout application days. In our 
preferred specification, we find no differences in the proportion female, prior earn-
ings, prior employment, or prior industry across the date threshold. Online Appendix 
Table 2 also reports these tests for the alternate date specifications for the non-in-
dustry covariates. We do find a small but statistically significant difference in age: 
waitlisted applicants were slightly younger than Core recipients. This difference in 
age may be a bias concern if employers are more willing to hire younger workers. 
However, at a minimum, results are not sensitive to how age is modeled. For exam-
ple, in the main employment regressions for the RD analysis, linear age controls 
result in an RD coefficient of −0.052 (0.026), including age and age squared results 
in a coefficient of −0.053 (0.026); with three broad age bands, as in our split sample 
analysis from Table 4 results in a coefficient of −0.054 (0.026); with indicators for 
each year of age, −0.056 (0.026).
While we are not able to test directly for any differences in preferences for insur-
ance since we do not have access to data on health care usage for the full sample 
of waitlisted applicants, for a subgroup of applicants living in rural north central 
Wisconsin and receiving the majority of their health care services from a dominant 
provider group, we are able to consider health care outcomes. We use the same 
regression discontinuity design from this study to look at how public insurance 
affects usage of health care and compare health care usage in the pre-period among 
the waitlisted and enrolled applicants (Burns et al. 2014). We find no differences 
among those who applied just before and just after the waitlist implementation for 
two years of prior emergency department use, inpatient hospitalizations, outpatient 
visits, mental health visits, or preventive care visits. This finding supports the valid-
ity of the design.
In addition, all individuals who enrolled into the BadgerCare Plus Core Plan were 
administered a health needs assessment. Comparing individual self-reports on rates 
of smoking and rates of chronic illness by week of application, we find no evidence 
that individuals who applied in the weeks just proceeding or during the announce-
ment week (the week of October fifth) differed from those who applied in earlier 
weeks (see online Appendix Table 3). This finding also supports the validity of the 
design by showing there is no apparent trend in the self-reported health needs by 
application date for those who received the Core Plan (although no data exist for 
those on the waitlist).
If the employment results reflect inherent differences between those who applied 
earlier and later and not those driven by the timing of the waitlist implementation, 
one might expect that using the exact threshold is not important, and similar results 
would be found when treating other dates as the threshold date. To check this, we 
perform placebo date tests for the preferred specification as well as for the alter-
nate inclusions of observations between announcement and waitlist implementation. 
Online Appendix Table 4 reports the results of these tests. In the preferred specifica-
tion, we do not find any evidence that using an alternate date would result in similar 
conclusions; there is no pattern of statistically significant differences between the 
redefined “waitlist” and “Core” groups when treating these placebo dates as the true 
threshold, supporting the validity of the design.
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In addition to our outcome measure that averages all available post-period quar-
ters, we have estimated specifications with both annual outcomes (probability ever 
employed in a year) and quarterly outcomes (probability of employment in every 
quarter prior to and following the timing of insurance receipt); the annual specification 
is reported in Table 2 and was discussed above, and the quarterly outcomes are sum-
marized visually in Figure 1; there were no statistically significant differences in any 
quarter prior to the fourth quarter of 2009; afterwards, we find a statistically significant 
effect of similar magnitude in almost every quarter covered by our data. Therefore, the 
results do not seem to be sensitive to the definition of the outcome variable.
Even considering this evidence supporting the design, it remains possible that the 
average person applying just after the waitlist implementation differs from the aver-
age person applying just before, biasing the RD estimates. As displayed in online 
Appendix Figure 1, the announcement substantially changes the number of appli-
cants, with a surge in applications of over 6,000 during the announcement week and 
a decrease in applications following the waitlist implementation. This suggests that 
some individuals were induced to apply either earlier than they otherwise would 
have (or they may never have applied). Some would have always applied that week. 
During the month prior to announcement, applications averaged 1,300 per week; the 
following month averages 840, suggesting approximately 460 applications per week 
“missing” or that 30 percent of the total increase in applications would have applied 
within the next 30 days. There is no way to observationally differentiate between 
these potential types of applicants. For this reason, we provide estimates in the next 
section using an alternative empirical approach that relies on different identifying 
assumptions as a complement to the RD analysis.
V. Difference-in-Differences Estimation
We now turn to an alternative empirical model to further support the robustness 
of our results. Because of the announcement issue, the regression discontinuity 
design is potentially imperfect; the average person applying just after the waitlist 
was implemented could be different from the average person applying just before 
the waitlist, which would bias our estimates. In contrast, a difference-in-differences 
model requires an alternative assumption: that underlying trends in the outcome 
variables between those who did and did not get the Core Plan would have been 
similar in the absence of the Core Plan. We also include propensity score weighted 
versions of this model (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997). Combining the differ-
ence-in-differences model with propensity score matching allows us to further adjust 
the comparability of the two groups based on past labor market history and other 
observable characteristics. If there were no differences between waitlist applicants 
and enrolled applicants, the regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences 
approaches would be equally valid. We think the ability to assess the robustness of 
the results across these methods provides more convincing evidence than imple-
menting either approach on its own.
The difference-in-differences model assumes parallel trends in outcomes between 
the Core and waitlist groups and takes full advantage of the panel nature of the employ-
ment and earnings data. The propensity score weighted  difference-in-differences 
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design involves making the Core and waitlist groups as comparable as possible 
based on observable characteristics. The most important difference with propensity 
score weighting relative to the regression discontinuity approach is the assumption 
required for identification: we must assume that conditional on observables included 
in the propensity score, there was no selection on time-varying characteristics in the 
date of application (Smith and Todd 2005). We include individual fixed effects in all 
difference-in-differences specifications so that any within-individual, time-invariant 
unobservable characteristics (such as a risk aversion parameter, preexisting health 
condition, or preference for health insurance) are differenced out of the estimates.
A rich methodological literature establishes the conditions under which the use 
of propensity scores is appropriate in examining labor market outcomes (examples 
include Card and Sullivan 1988; Dehejia and Wahba 1999; Deheja and Wahba 2002; 
Heckman et al. 1996; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Heckman and Smith 
1999; and Smith and Todd 2005). A key finding from this body of work is that the 
underlying assumptions of propensity score methods are best met by including data 
on lagged labor market outcomes; indeed, lagged labor market measures have been 
found to be the single most important set of matching variables. We have access to 
historical UI data, which we use to construct such measures for the study sample. 
Moreover, our data meet the other key conditions established in the aforementioned 
methodological literature: matched treatments and controls are drawn from the same 
geographical labor market and their respective labor market outcomes are measured 
in the same way (Heckman et al. 1996; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997).11
We provide estimates for two samples: an “all applications” sample, which includes 
application dates from the beginning of the Core program until an equal interval after 
the waitlist cutoff date (117 days), and we embed our regression discontinuity frame-
work within the propensity score approach and estimate these models on a second 
sample restricting to applications within 30 days of the cutoff date. The sample always 
consists of a balanced panel of all applicants within the two windows. The number 
of observations per person is therefore 28, reflecting seven years of quarterly data. 
Unlike in the regression discontinuity models, we include applications that occurred 
between waitlist announcement and implementation in these models, and rely on the 
fixed effects and matching to adjust for any changes in applicant types.
In particular, we estimate the following model:
(2)   y it =  β 0 +  β 1 Pos t it +  β 2 Cor e it +  β 3 Post × Cor e it +  φ i +  ε it ,
where  y it is an indicator for positive employment or total earnings for individual i in 
quarter t;  Post it is an indicator for 2009:III to 2011:IV;  Core it is an indicator for the 
individual enrolled into the Core Plan; and  φ i is an individual fixed effect.
We cluster standard errors at the individual level. For specifications that include 
propensity score adjustments, we estimate the propensity score using a probit with 
controls for quarterly employment for each quarter from 2005:I to 2009:II, quarterly 
11 Also of note is a German study that finds that propensity score models including lagged labor market mea-
sures and a set of demographic covariates similar to our own perform just as well as models augmented with addi-
tional person-level measures such as personality traits and motivation (Biewen et al. 2014). 
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earnings in each quarter from 2005:I to 2009:II, age, sex, and county of residence. 
We then construct a propensity score weight for each control observation (waitlisted 
applicants) using an Epanechnikov kernel weight and implement the estimation 
using these propensity score weights (Leuven and Sianesi 2003).
Table 5 reports the results from the difference-in-differences models. The models 
are based on equation (2) and all specifications include individual fixed effects with 
standard errors clustered at the individual level. These models thus difference out 
any time-invariant observable and unobservable individual characteristics, such as a 
static degree of risk aversion or preference for insurance. The coefficient should be 
interpreted as the change in average quarterly employment rates (or average quar-
terly earnings) over the “post” period (2009:IV to 2011:IV) from the average in 
the “pre” period (2005:I to 2009:II) for those enrolled in the Core Plan relative to 
those waitlisted. A positive coefficient means that Core recipients were more likely 
to be employed than waitlisted applicants. We note in particular that the estimation 
samples do include those individuals who applied between the announcement of the 
waitlist and its implementation.
The results of the difference-in-differences models, shown in the first column of 
Table 5, indicate a relative decline in the average employment rate of 5.3 percent-
age points for those with public insurance; these results are statistically significant. 
When we restrict the sample to those who applied in September and October 2009, 
the estimated relative reduction in employment rates remains very similar—5.0 per-
centage points—and remains statistically significant. These results are almost identi-
cal to the regression discontinuity results. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that pre-period 
and post-period trends in average employment for those who applied within 30 days 
appear parallel, and although not shown, the graph for the all applications sample is 
almost identical. In panel B of Table 5, we provide the results for treating average 
quarterly earnings as the outcome variable. The earnings outcomes suggest lower 
quarterly earnings for the Core recipients of $74 and $204 for the all applications 
and within-30-days samples, respectively.
Table 5 also includes the results from the propensity score weighted versions of 
these models in column 2. The propensity score predicts the probability of receiving 
Core conditional on past labor market history as well as other observable charac-
teristics. Illustrations of both the unadjusted and propensity score adjusted earnings 
for each quarter for the Core recipients and waitlisted applicants who applied within 
30 days of the waitlist implementation are shown in Figure 1. The figure makes 
clear that the effect of the matching is to eliminate any pre-period differences in 
average labor supply, so that any differences in outcomes are solely attributable to 
the post-period. Online Appendix Table 5 shows the means for the Core and wait-
list groups for both the all applicants and the applied within 30 days groups after 
matching. It also provides the results of a standardized bias test, which shows the 
difference in means as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances in both groups, and the results of a two-sample t-test for differences in 
the means. We can conclude that the matching process is successful; the sample 
that applied within 30 days of October 9 is particularly well matched. We provide 
the results of the propensity score estimation itself in online Appendix Table 6, and 
online Appendix Figure 4 illustrates the common support across applicant groups.
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When we estimate the models using our propensity score weighted sample, the 
employment results are slightly smaller, with a difference of 3.5 percentage points 
for the all applicants sample and 3.1 percentage points for the within 30 days sam-
ple, but remain statistically significant. Earnings results are also slightly smaller 
at $51 and $103 for the all applicants and within 30 days samples, respectively. 
While slightly smaller in magnitude than the unadjusted difference in differences 
and regression discontinuity results, these estimates also support the conclusion that 
public health insurance reduces labor supply.
All of the difference-in-differences results are robust to the inclusion of linear 
and quadratic time trends and quarter fixed effects, as well as linear and quadratic 
time trends that vary by county and county-specific quarterly shocks (modeled as 
county by quarter fixed effects). They are also robust to the inclusion of a full set of 
indicators for the number of quarters to application, addressing the possibility that 
the quarter in which application occurred could have been different for a subset of 
Table 5—Summary of Difference-in-Differences Results
(1) (2)
Panel A. Average quarterly employment
All application dates
 Post × core plan −0.053 −0.035
(0.004) (0.004)
 PS weighted X
Observations 1,587,264 1,563,772
Individuals 56,688 55,849
Within 30 days of October 9
 Post × core plan −0.050 −0.031
(0.007) (0.008)
 PS weighted X
Observations 389,872 383,600
Individuals 13,924 13,700
Panel B. Average quarterly earnings
All application dates
 Post × core plan −73.61 −50.7
(24.91) (24.21)
 PS weighted X
Observations 1,587,264 1,563,772
Individuals 56,688 55,849
Within 30 days of October 9
 Post × core plan −204.4 −103.1
(50.87) (51.85)
 PS weighted X
Observations 389,872 383,600
Individuals  13,924  13,700
Notes: The “pre” period includes 2005:I to 2009:II and the “post” period includes 2009:IV to 
2011:IV. All estimates include individual fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the 
individual level. Observations with application dates less than the absolute value of the differ-
ence from the first to last Core application (June 15, 2009 to October 9, 2009) are included in the 
“All application dates” specifications (waitlist applications after February 3, 2010 are excluded). 
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Core recipients and waitlisted applicants. These specifications are available upon 
request from the authors.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we examine the labor supply effects of publicly provided health 
insurance for low income adults without dependent children. Our findings suggest 
public insurance has a disincentive effect on the labor supply of low income child-
less adults. The sizes of our estimated effects are modest, indicating a relative differ-
ence of 5.2 percentage points in our preferred regression discontinuity specification. 
Among a population in which less than half of enrollees had any positive earnings 
in the quarter prior to application, these are economically meaningful effects: rel-
ative to the baseline 44.7 percent employment rate, the point estimate represents a 
12 percent relative reduction. The 95 percent confidence intervals for these results 
allow us to rule out the possibility that public health insurance enrollment increases 
labor supply as well as the chance that it causes large decreases in labor supply on 
average. Our evidence suggests the net effect on earnings (including those who lost 
or changed jobs) was a reduction of just more than $300 per quarter. We note that as 
both the Core recipients and waitlisted applicants were increasing their labor sup-
ply on average throughout the majority of the post-application period, these results 
should be interpreted not as the Core recipients actively resigning from current jobs 
but as a decreased likelihood of returning to the labor market.
There are several caveats to our results. First, while we find negative employ-
ment effects using two different and complementary methods relying upon differ-
ent identifying assumptions and across a variety of specifications, our identification 
strategies are not perfect. For example, even adjusting for observable differences 
between the Core Plan enrollees and the waitlisted applicants using the rich earnings 
and employment histories available in the UI data and employing both fixed effects 
and difference-in-differences (which net out any fixed unobserved differences) does 
not preclude the existence of time-varying unobserved differences between the two 
samples. Moreover, the waitlist was announced precipitously and may have resulted 
in unobservable differences between those who were willing to apply before and 
after; we do find differences at the cutoff discontinuity in the age of the applicants 
between those waitlisted and those enrolled, which may indicate a  violation of the 
RD identifying assumption. While these age differences are small and the estimated 
effects change little when we control for age in the RD models, the concern remains.
A second caveat, as discussed above, is that extrapolating from the Wisconsin 
Core Plan for childless adults to an expansion of Medicaid to childless adults in gen-
eral may not be possible. The two programs differ in an important way: Medicaid is 
an entitlement while the Core Plan was not. Since new enrollment into the Core Plan 
was ended on October 9, 2009, any Core Plan member who left the plan (perhaps 
as a result of gaining health insurance through a new employer), would not be able 
to go back on the plan should he or she subsequently lose private insurance. This 
would not be the case with Medicaid; individuals would be free to exit and reenter 
the program as their eligibility changes. The fact that the Core Plan is not an entitle-
ment could have had a “lock-in” effect on enrollees, exacerbating any employment 
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disincentive relative to Medicaid. However, the waitlist itself may have provided a 
disincentive to work if waitlisted applicants were trying to stay under the income 
threshold to remain qualified, and waitlisted applicants eventually had access to a 
stop-gap program. Although only a small percentage of them took it up, its existence 
would provide a work disincentive as well, and reduce the relative employment dis-
incentive of public insurance.
As with other studies utilizing unemployment insurance records, we do not 
observe transitions into and out of self-employment. As we cannot differentiate 
between self-employment and being out of the labor force, we could be overstating 
the association between public insurance eligibility and labor market attachment. 
Using auxiliary data from the American Community Survey, we explore trends in 
self-employment among the target population of interest over the study period in 
order to deduce the potential magnitude and direction of any resulting bias from 
mislabeling. This analysis is included in the online Appendix. While we find no evi-
dence that the inability to identify self-employed members of our sample is biasing 
us towards finding a reduction in labor supply, we of course cannot test for it directly 
in our own data. In addition, we are unable to observe the employment of individ-
uals who move out of state during the study period; this is likely to bias against 
finding any effect if those who did not receive insurance are more likely to move, 
as these individuals would appear to be non-employed in our administrative data.
Our estimates of the labor supply disincentive of public insurance are larger than 
those found by Baicker et al. (2014), which estimated that Medicaid enrollment 
led to a 1.6 percentage point reduction in employment in Oregon, and substantially 
smaller than those found by Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014), which 
found that Medicaid disenrollment led to a 60 percent increase in employment in 
Tennessee. One possible explanation for the variation in estimates is an interaction 
between the programs and the business cycle. Our findings reported in Table  4 
show that the labor supply response was greater among individuals who were 
not employed at the time of their application to the Core plan and that the stron-
gest response came from those living in counties with relatively low unemploy-
ment rates. These findings suggest that part of the reason for the larger estimates 
in Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014) and for the smaller estimates in 
Baicker et al. (2014) may be differing levels of economic activity across years and 
states. For example, the statewide unemployment rate was 5.6 percent in Tennessee 
in 2005; it was 11.1 percent in Oregon in 2009; and it was 8.5 percent in Wisconsin 
in 2010.12
An important question is how the recent Medicaid expansion enacted by many 
states under the ACA will affect the labor supply of newly eligible adults. Given the 
evidence presented in this paper, we believe it would be prudent for policymakers to 
be prepared to observe a reduction in labor supply among childless adults affected 
by the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act. Reductions in employ-
ment of roughly 5.2 percentage points (our best estimate) would be sufficiently large 
12 Another source of difference between the Oregon, Tennessee, and Wisconsin Medicaid programs was that 
the income eligibility thresholds differed across these states. It is possible that these differences contribute to the 
differences in the estimated labor supply effects of the programs. 
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to be noticeable economy wide. For example, if 21.3 million additional adults gain 
Medicaid coverage following the ACA expansions, then approximately 1.1 million 
fewer individuals will be employed as a result of the labor supply response. This 
aggregate response would be equivalent to roughly a 0.8 percent drop in the number 
of individuals employed in 2014.
It is important to note that the availability of generous tax credits for the pur-
chase of insurance coverage in state-based or federally-facilitated health insurance 
marketplaces under the ACA changes the consequences for becoming ineligible for 
Medicaid substantially. In the states that have expanded adult Medicaid eligibility to 
138 percent FPL under the ACA as well as in Wisconsin, which expanded eligibility 
to 100 percent FPL, individuals become eligible for the ACA’s Advanced Premium 
Tax Credits (APTCs) at the same income threshold at which they become ineligible 
for Medicaid. While it is unclear what the total effect of the APTCs will be on labor 
supply (as they are reduced with family income), it is likely that they will mitigate 
the negative labor supply effect of Medicaid. Of course, since many states have not 
yet expanded Medicaid under the ACA, estimates of the labor supply effects of adult 
Medicaid enrollment will remain highly relevant.
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